

Message Text

SECRET

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43

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
----- 110075

P 301029Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6526

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 8352

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CY, GR, TU.

SUBJECT: GREEK REQUEST FOR BHUTTO'S MEDIATION

1. FOREIGN SECRETARY AGHA SHAHI BROUGHT ME UP-TO-DATE
THIS MORNING ON RESULTS OF HIS TRIP TO ANKARA AND
ATHENS ON THE CYPRUS MATTER.

2. SHAHI REVIEWED BRIEFLY HOW PAKISTAN HAD FIRST
BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER AS RELAYED TO ME BY
BHUTTO ON AUGUST 16, AND REPORTED IN ISLAMABAD 7919.
AFTER THAT DATE KARAMANLIS HAD TOLD THE VISITING PAK
AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS THAT HE STILL WANTED BHUTTO TO TRY
TO PLAY A ROLE AT SOME APPROPRIATE TIME AND THAT HE WOULD
LET BHUTTO KNOW. AFTER THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER
DIRECT CONTACT WITH BHUTTO BY THE GREEK SOURCE WHO
FIRST CALLED BHUTTO AND IS STILL DESCRIBED ONLY AS
"THE FRIEND." KARAMANLIS APPARENTLY RELAYED MESSAGE
THAT TIME WAS NOT RIGHT FOR BHUTTO PERSONALLY TO TAKE
A HAND BUT TO PLEASE STAND BY FOR FURTHER WORD. SHORTLY
THEREAFTER BHUTTO DECIDED TO SEND AGHA SHAHI ON A FACT-
FINDING TRIP TO GET BETTER ACQUAINTED AS TO JUST WHERE
THINGS STOOD. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM BHUTTO
TO DEPART WITHIN THREE HOURS NOTICE AND COULD NOT SEE
ME BEFORE HE WENT.

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3. SHAHI SAID THEY FELT THE TURKS MIGHT MISUNDERSTAND

IF HE WENT TO ATHENS FIRST SO HE WENT BY WAY OF ANKARA. HE SAID HE WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH ECEVIT. HE SAID HE SENSED NO TRACE OF COCKINESS OR SENSE OF VICTORY, BUT RATHER WHAT HE FELT WAS A SINCERE DESIRE FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT. HE SAID ECEVIT SEEMED FLEXIBLE ABOUT SOME WITHDRAWALS AND HAD MADE THAT POSITION PUBLIC HE FELT DUE TO EXCHANGES WITH THE SECRETARY. ECEVIT SAID, HOWEVER, HE COULD MAKE NO SPECIFIC STATEMENTS, AS KARAMANLIS APPARENTLY DESIRED, ABOUT SPECIFIC WITHDRAWALS IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ECEVIT SAID HE DID NOT WANT DOUBLE ENOSIS OR PARTITION, AND WONDERED WHETHER KARAMANLIS MIGHT IN FACT WANT DOUBLE ENOSIS OR TWO-THIRDS OF THE ISLAND. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A LACK OF SERIOUSNESS ON THE PART OF THE GREEKS IN GENEVA WHO APPARENTLY FAVORED POSTPONEMENT OVER ANY DESIRE TO COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF TURKISH PROPOSALS.

4. SHAHI SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF IN MEDIATING ROLE IN ANY WAY, BUT NEVERTHELESS DID WHAT HE COULD TO SUBTLY EXERT PRESSURE WITH REFERENCE TO WORLD OPINION, TURKEY'S POSITION WITH GREAT POWERS, ETC. HE HAD SUBSTANTIVE TALKS THEREAFTER WITH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND AMBASSADOR BALUKAM IN WHICH HE AGAIN MADE IT CLEAR THAT BHUTTO HAD NO REAL DESIRE FOR ANY MEDIATING ROLE, BUT WOULD TRY TO HELP IF THAT WAS WANTED IN GETTING THE PEOPLE TOGETHER IN A MANNER THAT DID NOT INVOLVE HIM IN THE DETAILS OF A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THE TURKS TOOK THE VIEW THAT BHUTTO'S FRIENDSHIP FOR KARAMANLIS MIGHT BE USEFUL. THE POINT WAS MADE THAT TIME MIGHT COME WHEN COMPLETE OUTSIDER, LACKING THE INHERENT INFLUENCE OF GREAT POWER REPRESENTATIVES, MIGHT BE USEFUL. SHAHI SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THEM TO GO TO ATHENS. SHAHI SAID HE TOLD THEM HE HOPED THEY FULLY APPRECIATED THE DEEP WOUND FOR GREECE THAT THE EXPECTED TO FIND ON HIS VISIT THERE.

5. SHAHI WENT TO ATHENS ON AUGUST 23, WAS MET BY UNDER SECRETARY AT THE AIRPORT AND TAKEN RIGHT AWAY TO KARAMANLIS. KARAMANLIS ASKED SHAHI WHAT ATTITUDE AND SPIRIT HE FOUND IN ANKARA. SHAHI TOLD HIM THAT IT

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SEEMED CONSTRUCTIVE AND SERIOUS, AND REPEATED SOME OF THE THINGS MENTIONED ABOVE. HE SAID ECEVIT SEEMED TO SINCERELY HOPE THAT WITH THE RETURN OF CIVIL RULE TO GREECE, AND HIS OWN ACCESSION TO POWER, THAT THINGS COULD BE WORKED OUT FOR A LASTING PEACE ON THE ISLAND. SHAHI SAID THAT KARAMANLIS HAD RESPONDED THAT ECEVIT HAD ALMOST BROUGHT ABOUT HIS POLITICAL ASSASSINATION. WHEN SHAHI ASKED FOR EXPLANATION, KARAMANLIS APPARENTLY SAID HE

COULD BE UNDERSTANDING OF THE FIRST ACTIONS OF THE TURKS
IN VIEW OF THE STUPID ACTS TAKEN BY HIS MILITARY PREDECESSORS,
BUT THAT HE WAS FURIOUS THAT THE TURKS HAD BRODEN THE CEASE
FIRE SO FLAGRANTLY AFTER HE HAD ASSUMED OFFICE. HE SAID
THIS HAD PUT HIM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION BEFORE THE GREEK
PEOPLE AS HE HAD HAD TO TAKE A PUBLIC POSITION WHICH
SHOWED THE WEAKNESS OF GREECE. WHEN SHAHI SUGGESTED
THAT PERHAPS ECEVIT MAY HAVE BEEN HAVING SOME

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

----- 108880

P 301029Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6527

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 8352

EXDIS

TROUBLE WITH HIS GENERALS, KARAMANLIS RETORTED THAT
THE SAME WAS TRUE OF HIM AND THAT HE HAD JUST FIRED
ABOUT A DOZEN. KARAMANLIS APPARENTLY SAID THAT THE
TURKS MUST MAKE SOME GESTURE AND ECEVIT SHOULD STOP
SAYING BUBLICLY WHAT HE THOUGHT HE (KARAMANLIS) SHOULD
DO. IF ECEVIT WOULD ONLY TAKE ACTION TO WITHDRAW TO
AUGUST 9 POSITIONS THINGS COULD HOPEFULLY BE WORKED
OUT. HOWEVER, TO ENTER TALKS WITHOUT SOME GESTURE WOULD
BE INTERPRETED BY THE GREEK PEOPLE AS OUTRIGHT
CAPITULATION, AND HE COULD NOT BE PUT IN THAT POSITION.
KARAMANLIS ASKED THAT HIS VIEWS BE RELAYED BY SHAHI TO
ECEVIT. SHAHI REPLIED THAT THAT WOULD PUT HIM IN A
MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN TWO HEADS OF STATE, THAT HE
CONSIDERED THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO HIS FACT-FINDING
MISSION FOR BHUTTO, AND THAT IF PAKISTAN PLAYED SUCH A
ROLE CLEARLY IT SHOULD BE ON THE PRIME MINISTER LEVEL.

6. KARAMANLIS MADE REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT 200,000

REFUGEES HAD LEFT THE NORTHERN AREAS, AND ASKED HOW THIS COULD BE JUSTIFIED. SHAHI SAID HE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TURKS WERE NOT FORCING THEM OUT. KARAMANLIS THEN ASKED IF HE WOULD TAKE UP THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WITH THE TURKS. SHAHI HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT OF THE PLIGHT OF TURKISH ENCLAVES AS WELL, TO WHICH KARAMANLIS MADE NO COMMENT. KARAMANLIS REPEATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE BHUTTO TO
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PLAY A ROLE, BUT WOULD LEAVE TO BHUTTO THE MANNER IN WHICH HE APPROACHED THE TURKS AND WHETHER SHAHI SHOULD GO BACK TO ANKARA. IN MEANTIME, HE SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO THINK OF EXACT ROLE BHUTTO MIGHT PLAY, ACU ASKED SHAHI TO LEAVE THEIR VISITING AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS FOR FUTURE CONTACT.

7. SHAHI HAD HAD FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH POLITICAL UNDER SECRETARY TSOUNIS, WITH SHAHI SAYING THAT HE FELT THERE WOULD BE FIRM REJECTION IN ANKARA IF THE GREEKS INSISTED ON WITHDRAWAL BEFORE TALKS. SHAHI SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE FIRST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT DISPLACED PERSONS. HE SAID PAKISTAN HAD HAD A LOT OF EXPERIENCE ON THIS SUBJECT AND HAD COME TO KNOW THAT ONCE PEOPLE LEFT THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTY OTHERS MOVED IN WHICH WERE THEN DIFFICULT TO DISGORGE. HE SAID FROM THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE THE SITUATION VERY QUICKLY REACHES PROPORTIONS WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANY POLITICAL LEADER TO HANDLE, AND THEREFORE IMMEDIATE SOLUTION SHOULD BE SOUGHT.

8. SHAHI SAID HE HAD CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF HIS TALK IN ATHENS TO THEIR AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA, ASKING THAT HE TALK TO THE TURKS. SHAHI HAD APPARENTLY GIVEN EMPHASIS TO HIS TALKS ABOUT TURNING ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY TO THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES, LIFTING OF SIEGES, ETC. HE APPARENTLY MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT IF SOME MOVES COULD BE MADE ALONG THESE LINES PERHAPS KARAMANLIS COULD INVITE BHUTTO TO PLAY SOME ROLE WITH THE TURKS. HE HAD RECEIVED A REPLY THAT THE TURKS WOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE CONTENTS OF SHAHI'S TALK IN ATHENS. SHAHI SAID AT THAT POINT HE DECIDED TO CME HOME. BHUTTO HAD ASKED HIM TO BRIEF ME AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT HE HAD BEEN ILL IN BED SINCE HIS RETURN.

9. SHAHI SAID NOTHING HAD HAPPENED SINCE THEN EXCEPT HE HAD HAD A MESSAGE TODAY THAT KARAMANLIS WAS SEEING THE PAK AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS AND HE EXPECTED A PHONE CALL FROM THE AMBASSADOR AT 1430 HOURS TODAY.
BYROADE

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